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This paper develops a novel two-stage cost efficiency model to estimate and decompose the potential gains from
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). In this model, a hypothetical DMU is defined as a combination of two or
more candidate DMUs. The hypothetical DMU would surpass the traditional Production Possibility Set (PPS). In
order to solve the problem, a Merger Production Possibility Set (PPSM) is constructed. The model minimizes the
total cost of the hypothetical DMU while maintaining its outputs at the current level, and estimates the overall
merger efficiency by comparing its minimal total cost with its actual cost. Moreover, the overall merger
efficiency could be decomposed into technical efficiency, harmony efficiency, and scale efficiency. We show that
the model can be extended to a two-stage structure and these efficiencies can be decomposed to both sub-systems.
To show the usefulness of the proposed approach, we applied it to a real dataset of top 20 most competitive
Chinese City Commercial Banks (CCBs). We concluded that (1) there exist considerably potential gains for the
proposed merged banks. (2) It is also shown that the main impact on potential merger gains are from technical
and harmony efficiency. (3) As an interesting result we found that the scale effect works against the merger,
indicating that it is not favorable for a full-scale merger.
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1. Introduction
Providing financial services for small–medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs), Chinese City Commercial Banks (CCBs) play
an important role in the regional economic development in
China. Due to asymmetric information between banks and
enterprises, 4 state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and 12
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) tend to support state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and large enterprises, while ignor-
ing small–medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). CCBs have an
advantage of knowing more information on SMEs’ business
operations and lend to them much as their long-term relation-
ship with SMEs. Therefore, CCBs are always called as the
third echelon as compared to 4 SOCBs and 12 joint-stock
commercial banks. In recent years, CCBs have grown
intensely and outperformed in making significant gains of
market share while achieving high returns (Ferri, 2009).
However, CCBs face at least three problems in Chinese
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financial service market: (1) Majority of CCBs rely heavily on
their city’s economies, and only provide services for SMEs in
their cities. Due to the ‘‘single city’’ management model,
CCBs are greatly affected by the local economic development
level and the credit environment. As a result, the development
of CCBs is in the state of imbalance in the eastern and western
parts of China. (2) In recent years, banking regulators
reformed the financial system by paying more attention to
the reform of state-owned commercial banks and rural credit
cooperatives, but they ignored the CCBs. (3) They face the
strong competition with 4 big SOCBs and 12 joint-stock
commercial banks. Many CCBs are not clear about the market
position. Many CCBs are keen to compete with SOCBs and
JSCBs for large customers and big projects (Wang et al, 2012;
Wang, 2000). (4) According to the official report by China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2012, the total
number of CCBs is 142, and their total assets are 12346.9
billion (only about 9. 4% of Chinese banking system).
Under this situation, Merger & Acquisitions (M&As) become
an inevitable choice for CCBs to become bigger and get rid of
geographical restrictions (Gui, 2009; Zou, 2008; Zhu, 2007;
Garcı´a et al, 2009). In 2004, China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) promulgated the ‘‘city commercial bank
supervision and development program.’’ It clearly stated that
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CBRC supported the CCBs with good operating conditions to
voluntarily restructure capital and consolidate to improve their
risk-resisting ability and market competitiveness in accordance
with the market principles. Accordingly, many CCBs’ M&As
occur. For example, the Industrial Bank Co acquired the Foshan
city commercial bank in 2004. Huishng Bank in 2005 and
JiangSu Bank in 2007 are both resulted from the joint
restructuring of several small CCBs.
In the current literature, many efficiency-based approaches
such as accounting cost ratios (DeLong and DeYoung, 2007),
cost X-efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1992), and profit
X-efficiency (Akhavein et al, 1997; Berger, 1998), are used to
measure and compare the performance of banks before and
after M&As. They pointed out that there was no evidence to
show efficiency gains due to mergers, obviously their findings
depended on the sample data and the approach selected.
Therefore, it is important and necessary to develop pre-merger
planning approaches to estimate the potential gains from all
possible mergers (Epstein, 2004), which can help decision
makers to make a successful merger.
Recently, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (see Charnes
et al, 1978)—(CCR model) becomes a popular approach to
investigate the potential gains from M&As. As a nonparamet-
ric approach to evaluate the efficiency of decision-making
units (DMUs), its main advantage is that it does not require
any prior assumptions on the underlying functions between
inputs and outputs. It is a data-driven frontier analysis
technique that floats a piecewise linear surface to rest on top
of the empirical observations. So it can serve as a pre-merger
planning tool to measure potential input savings and output
improvements from mergers.
Seiford and Zhu (1999) applied an output-oriented DEA
approach to examining the performance of two hypothetical
banks that were resulted from two banks’ M&As. Gattoufi et al
(2014) developed a new inverse DEA approach to obtain the
inputs and outputs for a merged bank if an efficiency target is set.
Lozano (2013) proposed a cost minimization model and
obtained the potential cost saving to help decision makers to
find the best partner for a horizontal cooperation. Halkos and
Tzeremes (2013) applied the bootstrapped DEA approach
(Simar and Wilson, 1998; Dyson and Shale, 2010) to calculating
bias-corrected efficiency scores to measure efficiency gains of
45 possible bank hypothetical DMUs. All these hypothetical
DMUs comprised efficient DMUs. Bogetoft and Wang (2005)
used a radial input-oriented DEA model to estimate the potential
gains from mergers by maximizing the proportional input
reduction of the hypothetical DMU while keeping the DMU’s
outputs unchanged, and found that there existed several possible
mergers with potential gains. The overall potential gains were
then decomposed to technical, scale, and harmony gains.
However, they found that the hypothetical DMU may probably
surpass the Production Possibility Set (PPS) constructed by
candidate DMUs when using the input-oriented DEA model to
estimate potential merger gains. In this case, one drawback of the
model proposed in Bogetoft and Wang (2005) is that it may
become infeasible. Fa¨re et al (2011) proposed an output-oriented
DEA approach by maximizing hypothetical DMUs’ potential
revenues to identify potential partners, which can avoid the
problem that the hypothetical DMUs may surpass the PPS.
However, all above approaches treat each DMU as a ‘‘black
box’’ in M&As, but ignore the internal structure of the
production process. In many real applications, DMUs may
contain several production processes before achieving final
outputs (Kao and Hwang, 2008; Zha and Liang, 2010; Zhou
et al, 2013; Liu and Lu, 2012; Halkos et al, 2014; Aviles-Sacoto
et al, 2015). Recently, Lozano and Villa (2010) estimated the
potential merger gains of two DMUs with parallel structures and
found that a hypothetical DMU combined by two DMUs could
potentially have cost savings. Wu et al (2011) estimated the
potential gains of banks in the dynamic network from the
revenue perspective. This approach is extended by Wu and
Birge (2012) to measure the potential merger gains of banks in
serial-chain structures. The two approaches extended the pure
merger efficiency decomposition to a two-stage production
system after individual technical inefficiency is eliminated, but
they didn’t evaluate the overall merger efficiency. Because the
two approaches are from the revenue perspective, they avoid the
problem of the hypothetical DMU’s outputs surpassing the PPS.
On the other hand, in many real mergers, the performance
goal is set to minimize the total cost while keeping outputs at
current levels. For example, Chase Manhattan Bank and
Chemical Bank merged in 1995 with the purpose of cutting
operational cost as the two banks are near in the same city and
similar in operating business (Cattani and Tschoegl, 2002;
Rhoades, 2010; Epstein, 2005). After merger, the merged bank
has saved the expense of 1.5 billion US dollars including
shutting down overlapped branches and lay-off staffs. After-
wards, the Chase Manhattan Bank acquired Hambrecht &
Quist in 1999, and Robert Fleming & Co. in 2000 for the same
cost-saving purpose. Therefore, it’s necessary to evaluate the
potential merger gains from the cost perspective. But, a
problem arises that the hypothetical DMU may surpass the
frontier comprised by candidate DMUs. This might be one
reason that not many studies considered evaluating potential
merger gains from the cost perspective.
In this paper, we develop a two-stage cost efficiency model
by minimizing the cost of this new hypothetical DMU while
maintaining its outputs at sum of the pre-merger level of
potential mergers. Considering variable returns to scale (VRS)
assumption (see Banker et al, 1984), the hypothetical DMU
may surpass the original Production Possibility Set (PPS). We
thus propose to construct a Merger Production Possibility Sets
(PPSM) to solve the problem. Then, we extend this to a two-
stage structure to estimate the merger efficiency of a
hypothetical DMU for the overall system and both sub-
systems, and decompose the merger efficiency into technical,
harmony, and scale efficiencies for the whole system and both
sub-systems. To show the practicality and usefulness of the
proposed approach, we apply our model to estimating the
merger efficiency from mergers of CCBs.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the construction of the Merger Production Possibility
set (MPPM) and the models to estimate the potential gains
from M&As using DEA. In Section 3, the proposed approach
is extended to a two-stage production system. Section 4
presents a real application of Chinese City Commercial Banks
to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed approach. Conclu-
sions and guidance for future research are given in Section 5.
2. Preliminary considerations
Let us assume there is a set of n DMUs in set H. Each
DMUj j 2 Hð Þ consumes m inputs xij i ¼ 1; . . .;mð Þ to produce
s outputs yrj r ¼ 1; . . .; sð Þ. These DMUs construct a production
possibility set as follows:
T ¼ X;Yð Þ 2Rmþs
Xn
j¼1 kjXjX;
Xn
j¼1 kjYjY ; kj0; 8j

on
ð1Þ
Each hypothetical DMUJ J 2 UKð Þ is defined as the merger
of a set of K candidate DMUs in set WJK , W
J
K  H; where, the
total number of hypothetical DMUs in UK is CKn . In this paper,
we define the hypothetical DMUJ as a direct pooling of the
candidate DMUs, thus DMUJ’s inputs and outputs, respec-
tively, are
XJ ¼
X
j2WJK
Xj and YJ ¼
X
j2WJK
Yj; J ¼ 1; . . .;CKn ð2Þ
As seen in Figure 1, there are n candidate DMUs using
single input and single output. Two DMUs A and B have been
producing technically inefficient in the past as indicated by the
fact that they are not located on the efficient frontier. If they
merge but continue to operate as two independent DMUs, they
would spend (xA ? xB) to produce (yA ? yB) as a hypothet-
ical DMU indicated by the point A ? B. This is however a
technically inefficient combined production. Thus, it is
possible to find alternative productions that use fewer inputs
to produce more outputs. Many different methods could be
used to measure the potential gains of mergers. The simplest
way is to use Farrell measure on the input side. The Farrell
measure reduces to a simple comparison of horizontal length
between A ? B and C. The input of the hypothetical DMU can
be scaled down with a factor. If we have access to input prices,
cost efficiency could be used instead.
The hypothetical DMU (indicated by the point A ? B)
discussed above is in the PPS. Thus, the point A ? B could be
evaluated. However, sometimes a hypothetical DMU merged
by two or more DMUs may be very big and surpass the PPS.
For example, two candidates A and E are merged to be the
hypothetical DMU (A ? E). It is clear that the point (A ? E)
is outside the current PPS, hence it may lead to no feasible
solution to linear programs based on classical VRS models.
Thus, if we measure the potential gains of mergers by Farrell
measure from the input perspective, then the problem arises
that the hypothetical DMUs may surpass the PPS constructed
by n candidate DMUs in set H. Hence, it may lead to no
feasible solution to linear programs based on classical VRS
models.
2.1. Merger production possibility set (PPSM)
Let us consider a Merger Production Possibility Set (PPSM) as
follows:
MK ¼ ðX; YÞ
X
j2H
kjXj þ
X
J2UK
kJXJ X;

X
j2H
kjYj
(
þ
X
J2UK
kJYJ Y ;
X
j2H
kj þ
X
J2UK
kJ ¼ 1; kj 0; 8j
)
ð3Þ
It is constructed by n candidate DMUs and CKn hypothetical
DMUs from the possible mergers. Considering Figure 1, it is
clear that the PPSM is larger than the original PPS.
2.2. Evaluation of the potential gains from mergers
In order to measure the potential gains from mergers in the cost
perspective, we first estimate the cost efficiencies for each
candidate DMU and hypothetical DMU. Assume all input prices
are given as W 2 Rm. The minimal cost of each candidate DMU
while maintaining the output vector at the current level can be
calculated by C Y ;Wð Þ ¼ min WX0 ðX0; YÞ 2 Tgjf (see more
details in Cooper et al, 2007).
Figure 1 Overall merger efficiency and technical efficiency
from mergers.
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Similarly, the minimum cost for each hypothetical DMU
can be calculated by
CJ YJ ;Wð Þ ¼ min WX0J ðX0J ; YJÞ 2 MK
 ; J 2 UK
 ð4Þ
Based on the estimated minimal cost, we can calculate
efficiencies of candidate DMUs and hypothetical DMUs. The
cost efficiency of any candidate DMUj0 producing yj0 is
calculated by
CE0 ¼ C y0;wð Þ

wx0; ð5Þ
where wx0 is the actual cost of DMU0 and C y0;wð Þ is
calculated by C y0;wð Þ ¼ min wx ðx0; y0Þ 2 Tgjf . For example,
a cost efficiency of 85% suggests that the DMU can produce
the same level of outputs with 15% lower costs.
Similarly, the merger efficiency of hypothetical DMUJ from
the cost perspective is defined as a ratio between the minimum
cost and the actual cost of producing the output YJ as follows:
MEJ ¼ C YJ ;wð Þ=wXJ ð6Þ
As proposed by Begetoft and Wang (2005), the merger
efficiency MEJ can be decomposed into technical efficiency
(TEJ), harmony (mix, scope) efficiency (HEJ), and scale
efficiency (SEJ) such that
MEJ ¼ TEJ  MEJ ¼ TEJ  HEJ  SEJ ð7Þ
The calculation of technical efficiency and pure merger
efficiency can be summarized (see details in Bogetoft and
Otto, 2010) as follows:
TEJ ¼
X
j2WJK
C Yj;w
 .
wXJ ; J 2 UK ð8Þ
MEJ ¼ C YJ ;wð Þ
.X
j2WJK
C YJ ;wð Þ; J 2 UK ; ð9Þ
where MEJ is the maximal reduction in the aggregated inputs
of technically efficient DMUs in j 2 WJK that allows the
production of the output YJ . Hence we can save costs by
merger if and only if MEJ\1.
The harmony and scale efficiencies could be calculated as
follows:
HEJ ¼ C YJ=K;wð ÞP
j2J C yj;w
 .
K
; J 2 UK ð10Þ
SEJ ¼ C YJ ;wð Þ
K  C YJ=K;wð Þ ; J 2 UK ð11Þ
As these expressions show, the technical effect (learning
effect) TEJ measures the reduction in costs if each DMU
learns best practices but remains an independent entity. The
harmony effect HEJ measures the minimal cost of the average
output vector compared to the average of the costs corrected
for individual learning. The scale effect SEJ measures the
cost of operating at the full (integrated) scale compared to the
average scale of candidate DMUs. If HEJ\1 SEJ\1
 
, the
harmony effect (scale effect) favors the merger. If
HEJ [ 1 SEJ [ 1
 
, the harmony effect (scale effect) works
against the merger.
Decomposing the potential gains is important because a full-
scale merger is typically not the only option available for
DMUs, and alternative organizational changes may be easier
to implement. The approaches above could be extended to
systems composed of two processes connected in series.
3. Potential gains from mergers for a two-stage
production process
This section extends the proposed approach to a two-stage
process. Consider a generic two-stage process as shown in
Figure 2 for each set of n DMUs. We assume each
DMUj j ¼ 1; . . .; nð Þ has m inputs xij i ¼ 1; . . .;mð Þ to sub-
system 1, and D outputs zdj d ¼ 1; . . .;Dð Þ from that sub-
system. These D outputs then become inputs to sub-system 2
to generate the final outputs yrj r ¼ 1; . . .; sð Þ. Hence,
zdj d ¼ 1; . . .;Dð Þ behaves as intermediate measures.
As discussed in Section 2, each hypothetical
DMUJ J 2 UKð Þ is defined as the merger of a set of K
candidate DMUs with a two-stage production process in set
WJK , W
J
K  H. In this case, the total number of hypothetical
DMUs in UK is CKn . The hypothetical DMU’s inputs,
intermediates, and outputs, which are a direct pooling of
candidate DMUs’ inputs, intermediates, and outputs, respec-
tively, are defined as follows:
XJ ¼
X
j2WJK
Xj; ZJ ¼
X
j2WJK
Zj and YJ ¼
X
j2WJK
Yj;
J ¼ n þ 1; . . .n þ CKn
ð12Þ
Figure 2 Two-stage production process for CCBs.
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In this case, the hypothetical DMUJ with a two-stage
production process may surpass the PPS constructed by the
n reference DMUs. To solve the problem, we add all the
hypothetical DMUs in the current two-stage PPS to construct
the PPSM for the two-stage network.
The PPSM for the two-stage network is defined as follows:
MTK ¼ ðX; Z; YÞ
X
j2H kjXj þ
X
J2UK kJXJ X;X
j2H kjzdj þ
X
J2UK kJzdJ  ZX
j2H ljzdj þ
X
J2UK lJzdJ  ZX
j2H ljYj þ
X
J2UK lJYJ YX
j2H kj þ
X
J2UK kJ ¼ 1X
j2H lj þ
X
J2UK lJ ¼ 1
kj; lj 0; j ¼ 1; . . .; n
kJ ; lJ  0; J ¼ nþ 1; . . .; nþ CKn

8
>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
9
>>>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>>>;
ð13Þ
It is constructed by n candidate DMUs as well as CKn
hypothetical DMUs with a two-stage production process,
where kj and lj are the weights attached to sub-system 1 and
sub-system 2, respectively.
3.1. Measures of potential gains from mergers for two-
stage production process
According to the definition of PPSM for a two-stage produc-
tion process, we will present the two-stage cost efficiency
model to estimate the minimum cost of the hypothetical
DMUs. Under assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS),
we get the minimum cost of the hypothetical DMUL with a
two-stage production process as follows:
min
Pm
i¼1 wix
0
iL
s:t:
P
j2H kjxijþ
P
J2UK kJxiJx0iL; i¼ 1; . . .;mP
j2H ljyrjþ
P
J2UK lJyrJyrL; r ¼ 1; . . .; sP
j2H kjzdjþ
P
J2UK kJzdJ ~zdL; d ¼ 1; . . .;D;P
j2H ljzdjþ
P
J2UK lJzdJ ~zdL; d ¼ 1; . . .;D
~zdL0; d ¼ 1; . . .;DP
j2H kjþ
P
J2UK kJ ¼ 1P
j2H ljþ
P
J2UK lJ ¼ 1
kj;lj0; j¼ 1; . . .;n
kJ ;lJ0; J ¼ nþ 1; . . .;nþCKn
ð14Þ
where x0iL; ~zdL; kj; kJ ; uj; uJ
 
are decision variables, the objec-
tive of this model is to minimize the initial cost of
Pm
i¼1 wix
0
iL
charged to the hypothetical DMUL while maintaining the final
output vector YL in sub-system 2 at the current level. Suppose
the optimal solution to model (14) be x
0
iL; ~z

dL; k

j ; k

J ; u

j ; u

J
 	
,
then, the merger efficiencies of the hypothetical DMUL could
be calculated in a manner as discussed in Section 2.
Definition 1 Merger efficiency of DMUL for the overall
system and both sub-systems are defined as
MEL ¼
Pm
i¼1 wix
0
iL þ
PD
d¼1 wd~z

dLPm
i¼1 wixiL þ
PD
d¼1 wdzdL
MEL1 ¼
Pm
i¼1 wix
0
iLPm
i¼1 wixiL
MEL2 ¼
PD
d¼1 wd~z

dLPD
d¼1 wdzdL
; ð15Þ
where the numerator is the optimal values of model (14),
and, the price of the intermediates wd d ¼ 1; . . .;Dð Þ is set
to unity as the intermediate products are produced
internally and deemed to be equally important.
Proposition 1 The efficiency of any given hypothetical
DMUL is unity if its efficiencies for both sub-systems are
unity.
Proof Denote a ¼Pmi¼1 cix0iL, A ¼
Pm
i¼1 cixiL, b ¼
PD
d¼1
cd~z

dL, B ¼
PD
d¼1 cdzdL, then if the sub-system 1 and sub-
system 2 are both efficient, we have MEL1 ¼ aA  1 and
MEL2 ¼ bB  1 (b B B). It is obvious that MEL ¼ aþbAþB  1,
thus the sufficient condition holds, hence proposition 1
holds. h
Proposition 2 If MEL[MEL1, then ME
L
2 [ME
L
1; If
MEL ¼ MEL1, then MEL2 ¼ MEL1; If MEL\MEL1, then
MEL2\ME
L
1.
Proof As MEL ¼ aþb
AþB, ME
L
1 ¼ aA  1, if MEL[MEL1 then
Aaþ ab[ aAþ aB, ie, Ab[ aB, after arrangement,
b
B
[ a
A
then MEL2 [ME
L
1 . If ME
L ¼ MEL1 , then aA ¼ aþbAþB, we
have MEL2 ¼ MEL1. Similarly, we can proof if MEL\MEL1,
then MEL2\ME
L
1 , hence, proposition 2 holds. h
Proposition 2 allows us to have a comparison between the
merger efficiencies of different sub-systems within a two-stage
process.
3.2. Decomposing the potential gains from mergers in two-
stage production process
The measure of the potential gains from mergers encompasses
several effects. In this section, we decompose the overall
merger efficiency for the whole system and both sub-systems
into technical efficiency, harmony, and scale efficiency.
The minimum cost of DMU0 producing the final outputs at
the current level for each DMU individually could be
estimated as follows:
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min
Pm
i¼1 witi0
s:t:
P
j2H kjxijþ
P
J2UK kJXiJ ti0; i¼ 1; . . .;mP
j2H ljyrjþ
P
J2UK lJyrJyr0; r¼ 1; . . .;sP
j2H kjzdjþ
P
J2Uk kJzdJpd0; d¼ 1; . . .;D;P
j2H ljzdjþ
P
J2UK lJzdJpd0; d¼ 1; . . .;DP
j2H kjþ
P
J2UK kJ ¼ 1P
j2Hljþ
P
J2UK lJ ¼ 1
kj;lj0; j¼ 1; . . .;n
kJlJ0; J ¼ nþ 1; . . .;nþCKn
ð16Þ
where kj; lj; kJ ; lJ ; pd0; ti0
 
are the decision variables. The
variables ti0 and pd0 denote the optimal input and interme-
diates for each DMU0 after individually technical improve-
ment. The objective of this model is to minimize the total cost
of charged to DMU0 while maintaining the final output
vector Y0 at the current level. The VRS technical efficiencies of
DMU0 for the overall system are determined as ratios of the
minimum weighted sum of cost for DMU0 to the actual weighted
sum of cost.
Definition 2 The technical efficiency of DMUL for the
overall system and both sub-systems are defined as
TEL ¼
P
j2WLK
Pm
i¼1 wit

ij þ
PD
d¼1
P
j2WLK wdp

djPm
i¼1 cixiL þ
PD
d¼1 wdzdL
TEL1 ¼
P
j2WLK
Pm
i¼1 wit

ijPm
i¼1 wixiL
TEL2 ¼
PD
d¼1
P
j2WLK wdp

djPD
d¼1 wdzdL
; ð17Þ
where the numerator is the optimal values of model (16).
Then, the pure merger efficiency is to adjust the overall
merger gains for technical efficiency effect (Bogetoft and
Wang, 2005), thus we use the technically efficient DMUs as
the basis for evaluating the potential gains purely from
mergers as discussed in Section 2.
We could obtain the pure merger efficiency of DMUL after
calculating the technical efficiency.
Definition 3 Pure merger efficiency of DMUL for the overall
system and both sub-stages are defined as
MEL ¼ ME
L
TEL
¼
Pm
i¼1 wix

iL þ
PD
d¼1 wd~zdLPm
i¼1
P
j2WLK wit

ij þ
PD
d¼1
P
j2WLK wdp

dj
MEL1 ¼
MEL
TEL
¼
Pm
i¼1 wix

iLPm
i¼1
P
j2WLK wit

ij
MEL2 ¼
PD
d¼1 wd~zdLPD
d¼1
P
j2WLK wdp

dj
ð18Þ
where the denominator is the optimal solutions of model
(16) and the numerator is the optimal solutions of model
(14).
After considering technical improvement and eliminating
technical inefficiency we propose to obtain the harmony gains
by examining how much of average input could have been
saved in producing the average final outputs. The average final
output bundle is calculated as follows:
yrL ¼
1
K
X
j2WLK
Xs
r¼1 y

rj ð19Þ
The minimum cost of producing the average of the K
individually, technically efficient candidate DMUs could be
estimated in the following model:
min
Pm
i¼1 wihiL
s:t:
P
j2H kjxij þ
P
J2UK kJxiJ hiL; i ¼ 1; . . .;mP
j2H kjzdj þ
P
J2Uk kJzdJ  fdL; d ¼ 1; . . .;DP
j2H ljzdj þ
P
J2Uk lJzdJ  fdL; d ¼ 1; . . .;DP
j2H ljyrj þ
P
J2UK lJyrJyrL; r ¼ 1; . . .; sP
j2H kj þ
P
J2UK kJ ¼ 1;P
j2H lj þ
P
J2UK lJ ¼ 1;
kj;lj0; j ¼ 1; . . .;n
kJ ;lJ 0; J ¼ nþ 1; . . .;nþCKn
;
ð20Þ
where hiL is the potential minimum input vector while
maintaining the average of the output bundle in sub-system
2 at the current level. Model (20) minimizes the weighted sum
of inputs for DMUL. Thus, as discussed in Section 2, the
harmony efficiencies could be obtained.
Definition 4 Harmony efficiency of DMUL for the overall
system and both sub-systems are defined as
HEL ¼
Pm
i¼1 cih

iL þ
PD
d¼1 cdf

dL
1
K
P
j2WLK
Pm
i¼1 cit

ij þ 1K
PD
d¼1
P
j2WLK cdp

dj
HEL1 ¼
Pm
i¼1 cih

iL
1
K
P
j2WLK
Pm
i¼1 cit

ij
HEL2 ¼
PD
d¼1 cdf

dL
1
K
PD
d¼1
P
j2WLK cdp

dj
; ð21Þ
where the denominator is the optimal solutions of model
(16) and the numerator is the optimal solutions of model
(20).
Next, we obtain the potential gains from size effects by
calculating SEL that measures the cost of operating at the full
(integrated) scale compared to the average scale of the original
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entities in a two-stage production process. As discussed in
Section 2, the scale efficiency can be defined as follows.
Definition 5 Scale efficiency of the hypothetical DMUL for
the overall system and both sub-systems are defined as
SEL ¼ ME
L
HEL
¼
Pm
i¼1 cix
0
iL þ
PD
d¼1 wd~z

dL
K
Pm
i¼1 cih

iL þ K
PD
d¼1 wdf

dL
SEL1 ¼
MEL1
HEL1
¼
Pm
i¼1 cix
0
iL
K
Pm
i¼1 cih

iL
SEL2 ¼
MEL2
HEL2
¼
PD
d¼1 wd~z

dL
K
PD
d¼1 wdf

dL
: ð22Þ
The above equation presents the overall technical efficiency,
overall harmony efficiency, and overall scale efficiency. It is
also very important to correctly interpret the interaction
between these efficiencies in both sub-systems. For example,
when two banks merge, if the harmony efficiencies are very
low for both sub-systems, we would consider reallocating the
inputs and outputs between the banks rather than a full-scale
merger.
4. Application to City Commercial Banks (CCBs)
in China
4.1. Data
In China, the production system of CCBs can be treated as a
two-stage process including deposit-producing process (DPP)
and the profit-earning process (PEP) as shown in Figure 2. We
also selected inputs, outputs, and intermediate measures
similar to Wang et al (2014), as follows:
Inputs include (i) fixed assets (x1), which refer to the asset
value of physical capital, and (ii) employee expenses and other
operating expenses (x2), which refers to the payment to full-time
employees hired and the expense generated during its operation.
Outputs include (i) non-interest incomes (y1), which includes
fees, commissions, investment, and other business income; (ii)
interest incomes (y2), which refers to incomes that are primarily
derived from loans. The intermediate measure is the bank
deposits (z), which includes current deposits and time deposits.
In this case, the first system DPP shows the process of
acquiring deposits in terms of its current labor, assets, and
general expense. The second sub-system PEP shows the process
of utilizing these deposits to generate incomes. Here, the
two-stage process of the CCB system in Figure 2 shows that
deposits serve as an intermediate measure which corresponds to
the output of the DPP and the direct input to the PEP.
Due to the regulation proposed by China Banking Regula-
tory Commission (CBRC) that only CCBs with good operating
conditions are allowed to merge, this paper selects the top 20
competitive CCBs in 2012 as the candidate DMUs. The
summary description of the inputs, intermediate measures, and
outputs is documented in Table 1. The data are derived from
the Bank-scope resource package produced by Bureau Van
Dijk (BVD).
Here, it is noteworthy that all inputs have been transferred
to be cost measures, because the data already contain input
price’s information. Therefore, we set each input price to
unity when we apply our proposed approach to the dataset in
Table 1. All units of inputs, intermediates, and outputs in
Table 1 are in CNY thousand. It also shows that the data are
heterogeneous. For example, the fixed assets range from
411.8 to 6627.7, with the standard deviation of 1519.488.
The same phenomenon is observed with other variables,
indicating that the VRS assumption is more appropriate
than CRS.
4.2. Results and discussion
Given that in most real applications of bank mergers only two
banks are merged, therefore, in this case study we set K = 2.
Hence, the total number of hypothetical DMUs is C220 ¼ 190.
The distribution of hypothetical DMUs’ merger efficiency
scores under VRS assumption is shown in Table 2. It could
be noted that majority of hypothetical DMUs’ merger
efficiency scores are less than one for the overall system
and both DPP and PEP. So there exist considerable potential
merger gains for each hypothetical DMU under VRS
assumption. After eliminating technical inefficiency by
learning from best practice individually, only 138, 133, and
137 hypothetical DMUs’ pure merger efficiency scores are
less than one for the whole system, DPP and PEP, respec-
tively. This also indicates that the scale effects do not favor
the merger which our results are consistent with Bogetoft and
Wang (2005) that the gains from merging are considerably
less under the VRS assumption.
To further explain this result, we depict the distributions of
hypothetical DMUs’ merger efficiency scores, technical
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of top 20 Chinese city commercial banks of 2012
Variables Max Min Mean SD
x1 6627.7 411.8 2059.652 1519.488
x2 650237.9 166.7 46769.011 153056.122
z 614241.2 45363.9 178147.075 148080.95
y1 18773.1 1616 6026.997 4600.262
y2 2853.214 93.000 772.257 750.117
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efficiency scores, harmony efficiency scores, and scale
efficiency scores for the overall system and both sub-systems
in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6. As shown in Figure 3, we can
conclude that substantial potential merger gains exist for the
whole system since more than 97% of the hypothetical DMUs’
merger efficiency scores are less than one. It also could be
found that the distribution of the merger efficiency for the DPP
lie in the left part while the distribution of the merger
efficiency for the PEP lie in the right part of the axis. It
indicates that the hypothetical DMUs’ have smaller merger
efficiency scores in DPP than those in PEP. Thus, most bank
mergers gains more from DPP than from PEP.
Similarly, as shown in Figure 4, the hypothetical DMUs’
technical efficiency scores for the overall system are all less
than one and the hypothetical DMUs’ technical efficiency
scores for DPP are lower than those for PEP. Therefore, the
substantial potential technical improvements exist for the
whole system and most potential technical improvements
gains more from DPP than from PEP. Hence, more efforts
should be exerted in DPP to achieve technical improvements.
Figure 5 shows that the harmony effect favors mergers as
189 hypothetical DMUs’ harmony efficiency scores are less
than one. It can also be seen that the distribution of the
harmony efficiency for the DPP and PEP is the same,
indicating that the potential harmony gains from both sub-
systems don not have much difference.
Though the technical effect and harmony effect favor
mergers, the scale effect may work against the mergers. As
shown in Figure 6, 86.8% hypothetical DMUs’ scale effi-
ciency scores for the whole system are larger than one.
Moreover, 51% of hypothetical DMUs’ scale efficiency scores
(larger than unity) for PEP are larger than those for DPP,
meaning that cost potentially will increase. Compared to
previous study in Bogetoft and Wang (2005), technical
improvement and harmony effect contribute a lot to mergers,
while scale effect may work against the mergers which are
consistent with our study.
To further explain the most promising mergers and how the
potential merger gains could be achieved, we list the top 10
most promising mergers under VRS assumption in Table 3. It
could be found that harmony effect in both processes generally
favors the merger while the scale effect in both processes
generally works against mergers. DMU 15 (DALICITI) is
small in size, with 2334.1 units fixed assets, 256800.4 units
employee expenses, 173938.3 units deposits, 5559.2 units non-
interest incomes, and 626.6 units interest incomes. That is why
it is always a merger candidate. The results in Table 3 could be
recommended to the managers when making merger decisions.
For example, the A9 hypothetical DMU, which is combined by
DMU 6 (CHENGDU) and DMU 15 (DALICITI), has a merger
efficiency score of 38.51%. It implies that the hypothetical
Table 2 Distribution of overall and pure merger efficiencies (\100 %) under VRS assumption
Efficiency interval in % MEJ MEJ1 ME
J
2 ME
J MEJ1 ME
J
2
0–9.99 0 36 0 0 0 0
10–19.99 0 2 0 0 0 0
20–29.99 0 25 0 0 0 0
30–39.99 12 31 0 0 0 0
40–49.99 17 49 0 0 0 0
50–59.99 9 20 3 0 1 0
60–69.99 34 10 38 0 3 0
70–79.99 37 13 42 1 21 1
80–89.99 48 3 60 33 43 33
90–99.99 32 0 43 104 65 103
Total 189 189 186 138 133 137
Figure 3 Merger efficiency distribution under VRS.
Figure 4 The technical efficiency distribution under VRS.
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DMU’s potential cost saving for the whole system is 61.49% if
producing the combined outputs, and the potential cost saving
from DPP and PEP are 99.1 and 22.6%, respectively, ie, the
merger could achieve more potential gains from DPP.
Therefore, it is advisable for policy holders to exert more
efforts to DPP after merging the banks.
Table 3 shows that the pure merger efficiency score is
100.19%, which indicates that after individual technical
improvement, the cost of hypothetical DMU could potentially
increase by 0.19% if it is producing the combined outputs of
these two DMUs than that of producing the output bundle
separately. That is, the A9 hypothetical DMU would increase
0.19% cost than the sum of two individual technically efficient
DMUs’ (DMU 6 and DMU 15) cost. The harmony effect
shows that the hypothetical DMU could together save 1.3%
cost by producing the average output bundles. However, the
hypothetical DMU could potentially save 1.3% cost in the
DPP, and 1.3% cost in the PEP due to harmony effect, so it is
advisable for the management to exert effort to reallocate the
outputs to create more easily produced output mixes in both
DPP and PEP. We also can conclude that the scale efficiency
score is 101.51%, which indicates that the hypothetical DMU
would have a 1.51% increase in costs if it produces twice the
average output bundle. Furthermore, the scale efficiencies for
DPP and PEP are 104.16 and 101%, respectively, which means
that the A9 hypothetical DMU would incur extra cost of 4.16
and 1% in DPP and PEP, respectively, if producing twice the
average intermediate output bundle in DPP and twice the
average output bundle in PEP. Thus, the scale inefficiency
mainly comes from DPP.
Here, the positive harmony effect is dominated by the
negative-scale effect. Therefore, full-scale merger of DMU 6
(CHENGDU) and DMU 15 (DALICITI) is not proper. The
decomposition of the merger efficiency into technical, har-
mony, and scale efficiency for the overall system and DPP and
PEP allow us to identify alternative ways of improving merger
performance in DPP and PEP, respectively. When the
technical is low, potential merger gains are possibly by
learning from the best practice individually by introducing
incentives to motivate efficiency. When the harmony effi-
ciency is low, it is advised to reallocate the resources and when
the scale efficiency is low, it’s favorable for a genuine merger.
5. Conclusion and direction for future research
This paper introduced a new cost efficiency two-stage model
under the variable returns to scale (VRS) to evaluate the
potential merger efficiency of a hypothetical DMU from the
cost perspective and define merger efficiencies for the whole
system and both sub-systems. The method is applied to estimate
the potential merger gains from top 20 most competitive
Chinese City Commercial Banks (CCBs) in 2012. When
Figure 5 The harmony efficiency distribution under VRS.
Figure 6 The scale efficiency distribution under VRS.
Table 3 Merger efficiency scores of the top 10 most promising mergers under VRS assumption
Code Merger ME ME1 ME2 TE TE1 TE2 ME* ME

1 ME

2 HE HE1 HE2 SE SE1 SE2
A1 12–15 30.58 0.60 65.31 33.56 0.75 71.57 91.12 80.5 91.25 91.08 91.07 91.09 100.04 88.39 100.2
A2 15–16 31.67 0.62 68.46 33.70 0.75 72.76 93.96 82.84 94.09 93.89 93.87 93.91 100.07 88.25 100.20
A3 1–15 33.08 0.78 61.00 33.09 0.79 61.00 99.98 98.62 99.99 99.79 99.79 99.79 100.19 98.83 100.20
A4 15–17 33.78 0.73 66.75 34.20 0.77 67.55 98.78 95.47 98.82 98.59 98.59 98.59 100.19 96.83 102.40
A5 5–15 33.92 0.70 70.23 34.94 0.76 72.29 97.09 91.62 97.15 96.96 96.96 96.97 100.13 94.49 96.80
A6 4–15 36.32 0.76 75.04 36.32 0.77 75.03 99.98 97.79 100.00 99.81 99.81 99.80 100.17 97.98 101.40
A7 14–15 37.19 0.86 70.26 36.75 0.83 69.45 101.18 102.83 101.16 99.73 99.73 99.73 101.45 103.11 100.20
A8 15–19 37.37 0.79 76.26 37.09 0.79 75.67 100.77 99.85 100.78 99.75 99.75 99.75 101.02 100.10 100.20
A9 6–15 37.87 0.96 66.47 37.06 0.90 65.09 102.17 107.11 102.12 95.63 95.63 95.62 106.84 112.00 101.50
A10 15–18 38.51 0.88 73.43 38.43 0.86 73.31 100.19 102.80 100.17 98.70 98.70 98.70 101.51 104.16 101.00
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applying the method, we may face the problem that the
hypothetical merged DMU surpassed the PPS under VRS. To
solve the problem, we add all possible hypothetical DMUs in the
traditional PPS to construct the Merger Production Possibility
Set (PPSM). Then, we discuss the decomposition of merger
efficiency into technical efficiency and pure merger efficiency,
and the decomposition of latter into harmony efficiency and
scale efficiency for the whole system and both stages. Applying
the proposed approach to 190 potential mergers of CCBs
involving two branches in each merging activity, we can draw
the conclusion that there may exist significant potential cost
saving from hypothetical DMUs for the overall system and both
sub-systems under VRS assumption. This application shows
that the potential gains from technical improvement and
harmony effect both favor mergers, but the potential technical
improvements from the DPP are more than those from the PEP,
while, the scale effect may work against the merger. Thus, in
most cases, the full-scale merger is not proper.
In this research, the operating circumstance of all the DMUs
is consistent. In reality, the DMUs could operate under different
cultural (business) environments, which may have some effect
on the efficiency. The environmental factors are especially
important when the factors are partial causes of inefficiency, so
developing new techniques to incorporate the environmental
factors into DEA model would be a promising future study.
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